The end of development and begin of economic security

This weekend, I once again found myself trying to explain what I do for a living. I answered that I work in international cooperation. Then came the usual shortcut: development cooperation. The term created recognition. It also created confusion.

The image people had in mind bore little resemblance to my actual work. They imagined aid projects, perhaps humanitarian assistance. Yet my day-to-day work revolves around digital health systems and software implementation.

It is rare to find someone on LinkedIn that self-describes their job as development. Most of my colleagues work on climate policy, energy systems, innovation ecosystems or regulatory reform. Very few would spontaneously describe themselves as aid workers.

What if the growing difficulty of explaining our work is not merely a communication problem? This question matters because development cooperation is entering a profound crisis of legitimacy. Development institutions are searching for new narratives. Yet, according to OECD estimates, 60% of bilateral ODA between 2017-2021 “could be considered as the provision of global public goods”. Between 2007-2011 this number stood only at 37%.[i]

In fact, one could argue that what we call development cooperation has not been primarily about development for quite some time.

Development cooperation emerged in a world very different today.

Its institutional foundations were laid during decolonisation and the Cold War. As colonial empires disappeared, dozens of new states entered the international system. Western governments needed a framework through which these countries could be stabilised, integrated into global markets and politically aligned with the Western-led order.

When development cooperation emerged, Europe and North America dominated the global economy. The countries grouped together as the “developing world” represented only a small share of global GDP and geopolitical influence.

Today, China became a superpower. India became a major economic and technological actor. Indonesia, Brazil, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Vietnam emerged as influential middle powers.

We continue to speak about “developed” and “developing” countries long after these categories stopped describing geopolitical reality.

SDGs and Global Public Goods have already profoundly changed development cooperation

Long before today’s debates about economic security emerged, development cooperation had already undergone a profound transformation.

Climate change, pandemics, migration, biodiversity loss and financial instability cannot be understood as development problems. They are problems of interdependence.

The Sustainable Development Goals reflected this transformation. They were not simply a development agenda. They were an agenda for managing global interdependence.

It fundamentally changed what development institutions actually did.

The attacks of September 11 accelerated this shift further.

Fragile states ceased to be viewed only as humanitarian concerns. They became perceived as security risks. Development cooperation acquired another strategic justification: stabilisation. Development cooperation became tied to migration policy, counterterrorism and regional stability.

The geo-economization of global order might be the end of development but not of international cooperation

The defining political logic of the current moment is geoeconomics - economic security, resilience and technological sovereignty have become central concerns of governments. Supply chains, semiconductors, critical minerals, AI, biotechnology and energy systems are no longer viewed simply as economic issues. They are viewed as strategic assets.

The European Union’s Economic Security Strategy openly acknowledges this shift. And interestingly enough, one of its three central pillars is “partnership”. Much of the debate within development institutions has not yet fully absorbed what this means. The operationalisation of economic security partnerships remains in its infancy. The institutional architecture barely exists.

This creates an enormous opportunity for institutions working in international cooperation. They possess something valuable that few others have: global networks, long-standing partnerships, country presence, implementation experience and institutional trust.

The problem is not the work. It is the narrative

For years, the sector has responded to declining political support for development cooperation by pointing out that development contributes to other policy objectives. Development helps prevent conflict. Development reduces migration pressures. Development strengthens pandemic preparedness. Development supports climate action. Development contributes to economic stability.

While all of these statements contain some truth, they also reveal a deeper problem. If the political legitimacy of the sector increasingly depends on objectives other than development, perhaps the problem is not that the public fails to understand development cooperation. Perhaps the problem is that development is no longer the most accurate description of what the sector actually does.

Continuing to defend the sector through increasingly indirect arguments risks turning the debate into a losing battle. Instead of explaining why development contributes to climate action or security, it may be time to openly acknowledge that these objectives have become central purposes of international cooperation in their own right.

What is genuinely new is the rise of economic security as a central organising principle of international cooperation.

The growing importance of resilient supply chains, critical technologies, strategic raw materials, digital infrastructure and industrial capacity is creating a new demand for international partnerships. Yet even this should not be entirely unfamiliar territory. Economic cooperation has always been part of the field. The name of Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development contains both concepts for a reason. Trade promotion, private sector development, vocational training, industrial upgrading and economic integration have long been part of the toolbox of international cooperation.

The coming transformation is therefore less dramatic than it may first appear. It is not a wholesale replacement of one field by another. It is an extension of trends that have been visible for decades.

The truly radical change lies elsewhere.

It lies in finally abandoning the idea that development should remain the overarching description of the field.

The term no longer reflects the distribution of power in the world. It no longer reflects the objectives that justify international cooperation. And it no longer reflects the work that many international cooperation professionals actually perform on a daily basis.

Rather than trying to fit these new realities into an increasingly outdated development framework, the sector should embrace what it has already become.

There is, however, one final complication.

If development is no longer the right term, international cooperation is not necessarily the answer either.

International cooperation is ultimately too broad to function as a political identity. It is not a sector in the same way that health, education, energy or transport are sectors. It is a way of working in a world where virtually every policy challenge has an international dimension.

This is why the challenge ahead is not merely institutional. It is conceptual. We need a new language capable of describing what we actually do.

Some of these concepts are already beginning to emerge. The language of global public goods has helped explain why climate stability, pandemic preparedness and biodiversity protection matter far beyond the countries where investments take place. The language of economic security is beginning to explain why supply chains, critical technologies and industrial resilience have become legitimate concerns of international partnership. My own work on partnership-based industrial policy is one attempt to describe a form of cooperation that moves beyond aid and beyond traditional trade policy. Others speak of technology partnerships, resilience partnerships, innovation alliances, strategic cooperation or mutual-interest partnerships.

What are the concepts that can explain international partnerships in a multipolar world? What are the narratives that can mobilise support for climate cooperation, technology partnerships, economic resilience and global public goods? What are the political languages capable of connecting national interests with international action?